

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 220115

60

ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 PM-07 ACDA-19 ISO-00 INR-11 SP-03 SS-20

DODE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 OIC-04 NSCE-00 SSO-00 AEC-11

CIAE-00 H-03 L-03 NSAE-00 OMB-01 PA-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 /137 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/CE:HEWILGIS:EUR/RPM:GCHRISTIANSON:DPL

APPROVED BY C - MR. SONNENFELDT

PM - MR. GOODBY

ACDA - MR. HIRSCHFELD

ACDA - MR. NEWHOUSE

INR - MR. HYLAND

S/P - MR. BARTHOLOMEW

OSD/ISA - MR. BERGOLD

EUR - ;R. HARTMAN

S/S- MR. WOODS

----- 007994

O R 050044Z OCT 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO

ALL NATO CAPITALS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 220115

GENEVA ALSO FOR CSCE

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: MILI, PFOR, GW

SUBJECT: FRG/US POLITICAL/MILITARY CONSULTATIONS

1. SUMMARY. CONSULTATIONS ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUBJ-
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 220115

ECTS OF CURRENT MUTUAL INTEREST WHICH TOOK PLACE SEPTEMBER
27 IN WASHINGTON GAVE FRG AN OPPORTUNITY TO VOICE ITS CON-
CERN THAT THE INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS
(MBFR, SALT AND CSCE) BE STUDIED. GERMAN SIDE LED OFF CON-

SULTATIONS WITH A CONCEPTUAL PRESENTATION OF THIS INTER-RELATIONSHIP AND THE NEED TO RELATE IT TO DEVELOPING EUROPEAN UNITY. FRG DISPLAYED CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARD TROOP CUTS, WITHIN MBFR OR AS A RESULT OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES, AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN REDUCED TENSION IN CENTRAL EUROPE THROUGH STABILIZING MEASURES AND/OR CBM'S. US RESPONDED TO GERMAN CONCERNS AND ALSO BRIEFED ON OUR PREPARATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, THE NUNN AMENDMENTS, AND GREECE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO. END SUMMARY.

2. GERMAN SIDE HEADED BY VAN WELL (POLITICAL DIRECTOR, FOREIGN MINISTRY). MEMBERS: ROTH (DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER) GENERAL SCHUWIRTH (FMOD), RUTH (MBFR, FOREIGN MINISTRY), PFEFFER (NATO, FOREIGN MINISTRY), COLONEL TANDEKI (FMOD), COLONEL SASSE (FMOD), LAHUSEN (GERMAN EMBASSY), AND STELZENMULLER (GERMAN EMBASSY). US SIDE CONSISTED OF HARTMAN, SONNENFELDT, NEWHOUSE, HYLAND, LOWENSTEIN, BERGOLD, GOODBY, BARTHOLOMEW, GEORGE, STREATOR AND HIRSCHFELD (ACDA).

3. VAN WELL OVERVIEW. VAN WELL OPENED GERMAN CONCEPTUAL PRESENTATION BY TRACING "REMARKABLE" IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS SINCE 1969, NOTING THAT EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY WILL DEFINE WHAT NEW EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WILL BE AND HOW IT WILL AFFECT SECURITY SITUATION IN EUROPE. FOR THIS REASON HE URGED A STUDY OF INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG NEGOTIATIONS AND NEED FOR RELATING NEGOTIATIONS TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. VAN WELL STRESSED ROLE OF FRANCE IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND DEFENSE, ASKED RHETORICALLY ABOUT NECESSITY OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE, AND QUESTIONED WHETHER IN VIEW OF US-SOVIET GLOBAL INTERESTS THERE COULD BE IDENTITY OF SUPERPOWER VIEWS AND THOSE OF RESPECTIVE ALLIES. HE SAW EFFORT TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE AS COMPLICATING DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE BECAUSE OF INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISPARITIES IN REGIONAL CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. OVER LONG TERM, VAN WELL SAW IMPROVEMENT IN CONVENTIONAL BALANCE THROUGH EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 220115

IN THE MEANTIME, HE CALLED FOR INCREASED ARMAMENTS COOPERATION, BRIDGING GAP WITH FRANCE, AND GREATER COORDINATION OF SECURITY POLICIES--ALL WITHIN NATO FRAMEWORK. VAN WELL POSED IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF FBS, CLAIMING IT INEVITABLY WILL BE COUNTED WITH CENTRAL SYSTEMS IN SALT AND MIGHT LEAD TO NUCLEAR IMBALANCE IN EUROPE.

4. VAN WELL STRESSED NEED TO GEAR MBFR MORE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS AND SAID FRG IS WORKING TO INVOLVE FRANCE IN MBFR. HE ADVOCATED EXPANSION OF MBFR AREA, AT LEAST WITH REGARD TO STABILIZING MEASURES AND AIMED AT BRINGING FRANCE IN ON NATO SIDE. HE UNDERLINED IMPORTANCE TO FRG OF CBM'S IN CSCE, AND POSSIBLE LINK WITH

STABILIZING MEASURES IN MBFR--EMPHASIS AGAIN WAS ON INVOLVING FRANCE IN SECURITY DISCUSSIONS. IN LATER DISCUSSION, VAN WELL EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN SALT COULD LEAD DE FACTO TO NON-FIRST-USE OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND EXPRESSED IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING LINK BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL NUCLEAR FORCES.

5. US COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR ISSUES. NEWHOUSE GAVE BRIEFING ON SALT, EMPHASIZING FACT THAT US EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES TO ACHIEVE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE INCLUDING AGREEMENT BASED ALTERNATIVELY ON SYMMETRICAL FORCES, OFFSETTING ASYMMETRIES UNDER EQUAL AGGREGATES, OR UNEQUAL AGGREGATES AND ALSO EXAMINING RELATED POSSIBILITY OF PHASED REDUCTIONS. EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOVIET POSITION ON FBS HAS BEEN ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL AND JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCE IN NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS PERMITTED IN SALT I

AGREEMENT.

6. RESPONDING TO SPECIFIC CONCERNS RAISED BY VAN WELL, US REPS SAID THERE IS NO US INTENTION TO FORMALIZE NON-FIRST-USE OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND THAT NEW US TARGETING DOCTRINE PROVIDES FOR COVERAGE OF TARGETS OF INTEREST TO EUROPEANS. VAN WELL WAS ALSO TOLD BY HYLAND THAT IF THERE IS A SALT II AGREEMENT, PROBLEM IN 1980'S COULD WELL BE CONVENTIONAL AND TACNUC BALANCE IN EUROPE. EXCLUSION OF TACNUCS FROM BOTH SALT AND MBFR IS NOT LIKELY TO FIND
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 220115

FAVOR IN MOSCOW AND BE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

7. NATO DEFENSE ISSUES. WITH REFERENCE TO DRAFT MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, GENERAL SCHUWIRTH:

-- UNDERLINED VALIDITY OF DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, DETERRENT VALUE OF NATO TRIAD, AND ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF DENYING EAST ABILITY TO PREDICT NATURE AND EXTENT OF NATO'S RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION;

-- CAUTIONED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS MBFR LESSEN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY, THEREBY LOWERING NUCLEAR THRESHOLD;

-- CALLED FOR ENHANCING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND ENDORSED GENERAL THRUST OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S POLICIES, ESPECIALLY STANDARDIZATION, RATIONALIZATION AND SPECIALIZATION; AND

-- CRITICIZED DRAFT MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE DOWNPLAYING OF TACNUCS, WHILE STRESSING CRITICAL NATURE OF THE LINK BETWEEN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENSES AND

SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHETHER FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS BEING REINTERPRETED.

8. EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. PFEFFER, EXPANDING ON VAN WELL'S PRESENTATION, SAID THAT EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAPABILITY IS ESSENTIAL TO EUROPEAN UNITY BUT IS ONLY POSSIBLE WITHIN NATO FRAMEWORK UNDER US PROTECTION AND REQUIRES BETTER SHARING OF POLITICAL AND DEFENSE BURDEN. HE SAW EUROPEAN APPROACH AS BEST WAY TO EXORCIZE REMNANTS OF GAULLISM AND BRING FRANCE BACK INTO EUROPEAN SECURITY. EUROGROUP CANNOT BE NUCLEUS OF COOPERATION, BUT SHOULD BE RETAINED UNTIL SOMETHING BETTER IS DEVELOPED. PFEFFER ENVISIONED STARTING WITH EC-9, BUT EXPECTED DANES AND IRISH TO FALL AWAY LEAVING SEVEN WEU MEMBERS WHO WOULD WORK OUTSIDE OF WEU FRAMEWORK. HE FORESAW PERIOD OF TURBULENCE WITH PACT WHICH WOULD BE TEST OF EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY AND US SUPPORT. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION,

VAN WELL SAID SPECIFIC PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED IN EFFORT
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 220115

TO MAKE START IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION MIGHT INCLUDE

-- ARMAMENTS COOPERATION

-- DISCUSSION OF RELATIONSHIP OF FRENCH FORCES IN FRG TO NATO FORCES IN CENTAG

-- SECURITY POLICY, PARTICULARLY MBFR AND CBM'S.

9. MBFR. ROTH WENT OVER FAMILIAR GROUND CONCERNING FRG CONCERNS, REITERATING POINTS RAISED EARLIER BY VAN WELL AND NEED TO STABILIZE US PRESENCE. NEW WRINKLE, HOWEVER, WAS GREAT EMPHASIS ON MBFR AS LONG-TERM PROCESS AKIN TO SALT. ROTH REQUESTED CONSULTATIONS ON US DECISION RE OPTION III AND URGED US NOT TO MAKE DECISION ONLY ON BASIS OF INTERNAL PRESSURES. RUTH CLARIFIED FRG REACTION TO US PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER--FRG CAN ACCEPT ADDING AIR MANPOWER TO "NO INCREASE" FORMULATION, IS PREPARED TO STUDY INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER UNDER COMMON CEILING, BUT IS OPPOSED TO AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

10. HIRSCHFELD GAVE US VIEWS ON FALL MBFR ROUND ALONG LINES OF STATE 214580 (NOTAL) AND REITERATED THAT US HAS MADE NO DECISION ON OPTION III. SONNENFELDT ASSURED VAN WELL THAT US IS AWARE OF GERMAN CONCERNS ON FORM OF PHASE I AGREEMENT AND WOULD TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT AS NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED. HIRSCHFELD SAID IMPLICATIONS OF POTENTIAL FBS LINK BETWEEN MBFR AND SALT COULD BE ADDRESSED IF AND WHEN NATO DECIDES TO INTRODUCE OPTION III IN MBFR. VAN WELL EXPRESSED NEED TO AVOID ALLIED PARTICI-

PATION IN TREATY AS FORM OF PHASE I AGREEMENT AND URGED THAT ISSUE OF FORM OF AGREEMENT BE FACED SOON TO AVOID PROBLEMS LATER. VAN WELL ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SCALE BACK APPROACH AND OBSERVED THAT COMMON CEILING, WHILE REMAINING LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, NEED NOT BE PART OF MORE LIMITED FIRST AGREEMENT. VAN WELL WAS TOLD BY SONNENFELDT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHAT US MEANS BY LIMITED FIRST STAGE--IT MUST CLEARLY BE SEEN AS BEGINNING OF PROCESS OF MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS. PRESENTATION AS WELL AS CONTENT WILL BE SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 220115

IMPORTANT TO AVOID IMPRESSION IN US CONGRESS OF PHONY CUTS.

11. MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. BERGOLD REFERRED TO SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT TO THE DPC OF JULY 7, 1973 AND EXPLAINED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED (A CREDIBLE RATIONALE FOR DEFENSE SPENDING, ESPECIALLY FOR YOUNG PEOPLE) AND ECONOMIC NEED (A COMMITMENT BY NATO MEMBERS TO SPENDING LEVELS) FOR LONG-RANGE NATO POLICIES. HE EXPLAINED THAT OUR ATTENTION IS CURRENTLY FOCUSED ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE THE HIGHER PRIORITY IS FOR IMPROVEMENT, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE NATO TRIAD REMAIN MUTUALLY REINFORCING AND INSEPARABLE. BERGOLD ALSO REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR RATIONALIZATION, SPECIALIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION. HE SAID THESE WERE NOT CATCHWORDS FOR A REDUCED US EFFORT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY DO IMPLY THE NEED FOR EUROPE--NOT THE FRG--TO DO MORE.

12. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION, FRG DELEGATION REGISTERED AGREEMENT WITH THE THRUST OF THE US POLICY INITIATIVES. THERE WAS PROLONGED DISCUSSION OF THE NEED TO RELATE OUR ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN A CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE (AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONCERNING IT) TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

13. FRG OBVIOUSLY DISPLEASED AT INTRODUCTION OF AIR MANPOWER FIGURES IN MBFR, CLAIMING THAT SUCH A STEP WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO REDUCTION OF AIRCRAFT AND, PERHAPS, COMPROMISE OF THEIR DUAL ROLE. FINALLY, THE FRG POINTED OUT THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING WHAT COMPRISES THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

14. BERGOLD ALSO BRIEFED ON THE NUNN AMENDMENTS. HE SAID WE WOULD BE CONSULTING SOON ON WHERE TO STATION THE COMBAT TROOPS IN THE FRG WHICH ARE THE PRODUCT OF THE SHIFT FROM SUPPORT TO COMBAT PERSONNEL UNDER ONE OF THE NUNN AMENDMENTS. WHEN ASKED, HE SAID THAT WE DO NOT HAVE FIRM IDEAS WHEN AND WHERE THEY SHOULD BE STATIONED AND WOULD CONSULT ON THIS POINT (HARTMAN SUGGESTED JOCULARLY ON THE NORTHERN PLAIN). BERGOLD EMPHASIZED THAT SENATOR NUNN

IS REGARDED AS A FRIEND OF THE ALLIANCE, THAT DOD CON-
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 220115

SIDERS HIS AMENDMENTS TO BE GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE, AND THAT THEY ENJOY WIDE SUPPORT IN CONGRESS. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, HE SAID THAT JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT MAY WELL BE RE-ENACTED IN FUTURE YEARS IF THE BOP DOES NOT IMPROVE.

15. VAN WELL ALSO CALLED FOR AN EXPRESSION OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL INTEREST IN RATIONALIZATION, SPECIALIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION IN ORDER TO INVOLVE THE FRENCH. HE SAID THE FRENCH REGARD THE EUROGROUP AS AN ORGANIZATION

WHOSE SOLE FUNCTION IS TO PURCHASE US ARMS. CONSEQUENTLY, TALKS ABOUT THEIR JOINING IT ARE STALLED. FRENCH INTEREST IN ARMAMENTS COOPERATION REMAINS HIGH, HOWEVER, AND THE FRG WILL APPROACH THE FRENCH BILATERALLY TO POINT OUT THE COMMON FEATURES OF THE US INITIATIVES AND THIS FRENCH INTEREST.

16. HARTMAN BRIEFED ON THE US POSITION THAT THE PACE OF GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO SHOULD NOT BE FORCED, EXPLAINING THE FACTORS WITHIN NATO AND WITHIN GREECE WHICH SUPPORT THIS POLICY. VAN WELL AGREED, BUT STIPULATED THAT THE ALLIES MUST NOT GIVE GREECE THE IMPRESSION THAT ITS MOVE TO WITHDRAW FROM NATO IS NOT TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO. FOLLOWING A DISCUSSION OF THE STATUS OF GERMAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY (SUSPENDED) AND GREECE (NOT REINSTATED), HARTMAN TOLD VAN WELL THAT WE HOPED THE FRG WOULD RENEW AID TO TURKEY. KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MEETINGS, EAST WEST MEETINGS, TROOP REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE220115
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/CE:HEWILGIS:EUR/RPM:GCHRISTIANSON:DPL
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740282-0244
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741092/abbryzya.tel
Line Count: 307
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by martinml>; APPROVED <21 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FRG/US POLITICAL/MILITARY CONSULTATIONS
TAGS: MILI, PFOR, GE, US, XG, NATO, (VAN WELL)
To: BONN INFO NATO
ALL NATO CAPITALS
MBFR VIENNA
GENEVA
MOSCOW
SALT TWO GENEVA
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005